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## Us Participation in Western European International Relations 1945-1990

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**Annotation:** This article scientifically analyzes the history of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Western European countries after the Second World War (1970-1980).

**Keywords:** USA, Great Britain, Western Europe, Cold War, World War II, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, European Recovery Program, NATO, protectionism, diplomacy.

### Introduction

In the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, everywhere, especially in Europe, the increase in the degree of direct influence on international relations compared to other regions was a long-term phenomenon that was fully revealed only after the end of the "Cold War". began to manifest itself in energy, economic and technological requirements. Despite the conditions of disagreements about the bloc in Europe, the growth of the moving forces in the regional situation was connected with the opposition of the blocs.

Energy, economic and technological demands in Europe, which started in the mid-1970s, began to manifest in the growth of its influence on energy, economic and technological factors in both parts of Europe.

### DISCUSSION

For Western Europe, the energy crisis of 1973 was followed by the cold winter shock of 1973/74. In this situation, the governments of Western European countries were forced to think about strengthening energy security. According to the relevant program, the main attention was paid to the diversification of the energy transport import source. Since Western Europe itself is not rich in oil and gas resources, and until 1973, it had to import two-thirds of its consumption of energy products (oil and gas). Reducing dependence on imports of energy products from the Arab world was possible only by expanding cooperation with the USSR in this field.

The next economic crisis occurred in 1974/75, comparable to the "great depression" of the late 1920s in terms of its destructive power, which affected Western Europe much more than the United States. Stagnation followed by stagnation (called "stagflation" due to the general stagnation associated with economic processes and the fact that inflation did not end) in the second half of the 1970s, in the 1980s, the growth of a new economic crisis began.

Recurring crises in this particular period, which require economic, restructuring as a result of a new stage of scientific, technical and technological development by the USA, occurred along with a number of structural crises. In the 1980s, the sharp departure of the USA not only from Western Europe, but also from the whole world manifested itself primarily in the field of military technology. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SMT), announced by R. Reagan in March 1983, signaled the beginning of a new stage of the military-technical revolution. The level of adoption of new information technologies has become an indicator of the level of technical armament of the states.

According to these indicators, the countries of Western Europe have shown that they are not ready in the full sense, both technically and in terms of financial capabilities.

Due to the fact that the prosperity of the economy of Western Europe depends to a large extent on exports, the development of the economy of Western Europe in the crisis situation, the question of finding new markets has become more urgent than ever. The development of economic cooperation with Eastern European countries has become one of the means of solving the economic problems of Western Europe.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Europe, which joined the world economy as a minor power, were not directly affected by the world economic upheaval in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. However, during this period, the socialist countries of Europe showed an increase in their economic and social internal system problems.

In the late 1970s, economic growth slowed down, and in the early 1980s, it was replaced by an economic stagnation with a low standard of living. This is explained by the fact that the socialist system of economic management has reached the end of its extensive development possibilities. In order to transition to rapid growth, it was necessary to change the system itself. The USSR was not ready for this. In addition, except in the military and space spheres, the Soviet Union lagged behind the West in the pace of scientific and technical development. The American project of the Strategic Defense Initiative did not just pose a threat to the security of the USSR. The fact that the USSR was lagging behind in the field of high-tech development became very important.

On the one hand, the difficult economic situation created by the Soviet leaders intensified the temptation to "solve problems easily" at the expense of income from the export of energy products (called "petrodollars"), which the Soviet leaders could not control. On the other hand, under these circumstances, the interest of the USSR and other socialist countries in the development of scientific, technical and economic cooperation with the Western countries has increased.

Thus, between the 1970s and 1980s, energy, technological, and economic factors literally created the conditions for the importance of Europe's divided East-West economic pragmatic relations. That's why the US call for sanctions against the socialist countries was not always met with unconditional support by the Western European governments.

The desire of the Western European countries to receive the political dividends of their increased economic influence could not affect the nature of their political relations with the United States. The western European variant called "Vietnam syndrome" played a major role in this type of attitude: Western European countries did not want to be drawn into force actions by the United States within the framework of their personal national interests again.

Western Europe can achieve an increase in its political influence in relations with the United States only by accelerating integration in the economic, political and military spheres. However, in the first half of the 1970s and 1980s, the movement towards a political and military union on the basis of the European Cooperation (EU) slowed down for various reasons. Therefore, in the 1950s and 1960s, a rather complicated combination of economic competition and political cooperation within the framework of "Atlantic solidarity" in the Euro-Atlantic community changed the forces of interaction in this period, which directly led to "Atlantic dependence". the direction of reduction was carried out. At the same time, in this period, Western Europe's dependence on the United States in the field of defense not only decreased, but also increased.

The change in the form of internal relations of the Euro-Atlantic Community was also noted in the "Declaration on Atlantic Relations" adopted on June 26, 1974.

The following activities took place around the development of this document. In 1973, on the eve of NATO's quarter-century anniversary, G. Kissinger (US Secretary of State at that time) proposed a new draft of the Atlantic Charter. In this document, the United States is of global importance, and Western Europe is of dependent territorial importance. The Europeans did not like the way the issue was put, and the ideas of the charter were rejected. At the same time, the compromise text of the Declaration of 1974 appeared.

The content of the Declaration of 1974 can be summed up in three points. First, it was determined to "strengthen the practice of openness and timely consultation" on issues of mutual interest that may arise in the political sphere, including within the framework of NATO's responsibility. In other words, the issue of distribution of global and regional importance in NATO was officially dropped. Secondly, in the field of economic relations, the document was aimed at eliminating the source of economic conflicts between the countries-members of the Alliance. Thirdly, the problem of increasing the efficiency of Western European defense in the conditions of global parity (equilibrium) between the USSR and the USA in the military sphere was highlighted. In addition, in this Declaration, new problems regarding the provision of common Atlantic defense between the Western European allies and the United States and later called the problem of "burden sharing" were stated. According to NATO, the share of Western Europe in the composition of conventional armed forces and armaments at that time was approximately 75%. NATO's nuclear capabilities were mainly provided by the USA and to a lesser extent Great Britain. The French nuclear forces had an independent status and were subordinated directly to the French national command, not to NATO. As noted in the declaration, each member of the Alliance must contribute their share of the cost of maintaining a cooperative defense according to their contribution to the system. In the development of this topic, a strategic decision was made at the Washington summit of NATO in 1978, which was held as part of the Alliance's long-term military planning program. According to him, in the future, all the countries of the Alliance should increase their military spending by three percent every year. Later, all European members of NATO were able to implement this decision. In the beginning, the total military expenditure of the Western European countries of NATO was lower than the military expenditure of the USA. With this, the Western press provided various information about what part of the military expenditure of the United States is actually aimed at ensuring the defense of Western Europe. The beginning of the 1980s was marked by disagreements between the United States and its Western European allies on the precise methodological aspects of European defense.

On the one hand, at that time, the common interests of the West in Eastern relations made it possible to strengthen the "Atlantic unity" at a decisive level. Armelya's two-task program report adopted by NATO as early as 1967 - western deterrence of socialist countries and political negotiations with them - has retained its importance in the full sense. This strategic direction was confirmed in the special statement on relations between the West and the East, adopted by the session of the NATO Council held in Washington in May 1984. However, within this general strategic direction, the United States preferred the method of using sharp force. Europeans showed great enthusiasm for political negotiations.

On the other hand, the geographical proximity of the USSR to Western Europe made the USA's Western European allies particularly vulnerable to Soviet "superarmament" factors. And here in Western Europe, I had to look for a subtle interaction between the goals of the two different directions without any exaggeration. First, maintaining and strengthening the military presence of the United States in Western Europe as a real possibility of the only confrontation of the USSR. Second, to protect itself from ending the American tendency to act unilaterally without taking into account the interests of allies. As a result of this, there was a certain tension in the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic and the activation of disputes about the independence of the defense of Western Europe

and the increase in the role of NATO as the "support of Europe".

The Stockholm Conference on Disarmament and Security and Confidence Building Measures in Europe, the third overall meeting in Vienna within the framework of the Helsinki Process, started according to the strict schedule established in Madrid. The success of these meetings exceeded expectations. However, thanks to the ideas and practices of the "new political thoughts" of the USSR, these successes were due to the positive changes in the relations between the West and the East that began in the second half of the 1980s. But this is now a different history - the return to disarmament and the end of the Cold War. On November 20-21, 1990, the extraordinary high-level meeting of the member states of the ECSC held in Paris was a stage of sharp change in the elimination of the cold war in Europe. This meeting is rightfully considered the last period in the history of the "cold war". The Charter of Paris for a new Europe, the joint declaration of twenty-two countries, agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe adopted at this meeting are the initial ideological, political, organizational and military conditions for the future transformation of the CSTO into a transregional structure of collective security in Europe. created the conditions. In Europe, the concepts of "East" and "West" began to acquire geographical meanings that appeared first.

## **RESULTS**

On November 19, 1990, in Paris, as a result of the signing of the Convention on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the military-political basis of the new post-conflict security system in Europe was created. This document was developed as the first result of the negotiations on the Vienna mandate of the ECSC, which began in Vienna in March 1989. The nature of the reduction of regular armed forces in Europe, provided for in the treaty, is noted as follows:

1. Establishing parity between NATO and CSTO at the lowest level of conventional armaments;
2. Limiting the offensive potential of conventional weapons in Europe and minimizing the risk of a surprise attack. Five categories of reduction to the level of conventional armaments included the basis of attack potential - tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.
3. To establish a sufficient level of armament for each of the country-participants who signed the agreement. It was necessary that this level should not exceed 1/3 of the total military capabilities of NATO and CSTO in Europe.
4. To prevent the deployment of troops for a sudden attack. In this regard, all regions of reduction were divided into four regional zones. In addition, a side zone was introduced in territorial regions related to NATO and CSTO. Each of these zones has its own limitations.
5. Establishment of a practical system of control over the execution of the contract, including the principles of on-site inspection.

The treaty was open-ended and had to be ratified by all signatories. Article XIX of the agreement provided for the possibility of filling in the next notices. This important provision made it possible to continue negotiations on the total number of personnel of the armed forces not included in the treaty, as well as the appearance of the naval forces and regular armed forces.

## **CONCLUSION**

On November 17, 1990, two days before the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document on Confidence-Building Measures, the third generation of confidence-building measures developed as part of the "35 Talks", was signed. . Among them were documents on the exchange of information about ground and air forces, plans for the development of the main

system of armaments and equipment, and documents about the military budget. In addition, a new cooperation mechanism and a number of other measures were introduced in connection with dangerous conflicts of a military nature.

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